The 5 Main Reasons Why Rhodesia Lost the Bush War

When Rhodesia began, in 1964, her Bush War for independence against both the British Commonwealth and communist guerrillas, it thought the matter was a mere police action like Britain’s Malayan Emergency. 

A small war of militarized police against minuscule numbers of inept, poorly armed guerrillas. By 1979, after 15 years of grinding war in the bush, it found itself to be in a massive war against much of the world, a war it couldn’t win. And so in 1980, power was handed to Mugabe, the People’s Republic of China-backed tyrant. 

 

 

 

The Rhodesian Bush War: Myth vs. Reality

The legend of that war has grown as the years war on, with many, particularly conservatives disgusted with the present state of the world, seeing it as a sterling example of poor Cold War policy paired with Albion showing its usual perfidity, as former Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith explains well in The Great Betrayal. 

Further, many see it as a heroic last stand of old, colonial civilization fighting a Rorke’s Drift-like action against an overwhelming horde of rebels, but losing in the end after a valiant and impressive effort.

That legend, in turn, presents a common question: how, if the legend is true, did it manage to lose the Bush War against the communist rebels? “If,” so the question normally goes, “the Rhodesians were so good at light infantry combat that they had somewhere around a 9:1 or even 15:1 kill-death ratio for the war, how did they lose? Doesn’t their defeat show that the statistics supporting their combat prowess are mere lies?”

The truth of the matter is that while Rhodesia’s combat statistics are approximately true – in numerous well-documented operations, such as Operation Eland, it managed to slay over a thousand communist guerrillas and suffered no casualties of its own–it lost for a number of reasons, most of which were out of its control. 

Those five reasons Rhodesia lost the Bush War will be discussed below. They are, in quick summary and order of importance:

1. The UN-demanded and US+UK-enforced embargo

2. The Portuguese Carnation Revolution

3. Demographic change as white Rhodesians fled communist barbarity

4. South Africa’s wish for detente

5. Poor military strategy

1. The Embargo That Doomed Rhodesia To Lose the Bush War

On December 23, 1966, roughly a year and a month after Rhodesia unilaterally declared independence on November 11, 1965, the United Nations made history by passing its first-ever mandatory sanctions package. 

A Unanimous UN Vote Against Trade With Rhodesia

The vote was unanimous amongst the 11 members of the UN Security Council, and so the UN required that all 122 of its member states that wished to remain in good standing were forbidden from selling Rhodesia oil, arms, motor vehicles, or airplanes, or from providing it with absolutely any form “financial or other economic aid.” 

Further, nearly 90% of Rhodesia’s primarily agricultural exports were embargoed under the UN vote, essentially severing it from nearly all of the outside world. When the vote passed, only the Republic of South Africa and Salazar’s Portugal refused to comply; Israel later refused to comply as well, selling Rhodesia small arms and helicopters.

How the Embargo Hurt Rhodesia’s War Efforts

That embargo was a major impediment to Rhodesia’s Bush War combat effort, particularly in its restriction on selling Rhodesia mechanized equipment, aircraft, or oil. 

Namely, roughly two-thirds of Rhodesia’s massive, over 3000 kilometers-long border (Texas, by contrast, has a border slightly less than 2,000 km long) had to be patrolled by what little it could muster that could move faster than a man. 

A few planes were available, some armored cars were in the inventory, but eventually it was the 800-strong Grey’s Scouts – men on horseback–who did much of the patrolling alongside a paltry few scout planes. 

Communist Terrorists Infiltrated Rhodesia’s Weakened Borders

Such a task was impracticable; imagine trying to patrol Texas with under 1000 men! 

It would be, and was, impossible, particularly after Mozambique fell to the communists and those communist terrorists could sneak in across that 1400 km-long border rather than just its roughly 800 km-long border with Zambia.

So, because the country could not be adequately patrolled and terrorists stopped at the border, those terrorists were able to get into the country and do a great deal of damage. They killed livestock and farm laborers, attacked farm houses, tortured villagers into aiding them, and generally acted like an even more brutal version of the Viet Cong. 

Had the West been able to sell (or even better, gift) Rhodesia combat and surveillance aircraft, it might have been able to keep the terrorists at bay. Instead, it was left underresourced and suffered the full brunt of terrorist attacks, as they were able to slip past border patrol units and sink their red talons into the country.

More Problems Caused by the Rhodesian Embargo

The embargo caused other issues as well. For example, Rhodesia had a thriving agricultural sector before the war that produced world-famous tobacco and much of the region’s grain. With the UN embargo, however, farmers faced a litany of problems. 

For one, the petrol they needed to run modernized agricultural operations was scarce, as the oil-devoid country couldn’t import the precious liquid–unless South Africa or Portugal were willing to sneak some in–due to the embargo. 

Second, it was increasingly difficult to get their goods to market, as the terrorists not only attacked their farms but also placed landmines on the roads that made trucks dangerous to operate. 

And, of course, even if they could grow the crops and get them to a transportation hub, there was little market for them, as the embargo made buying Rhodesian goods generally illegal and by the point the Portuguese fell and South Africans betrayed them in the mid-1970s, there was nearly no one to export to. The same situation played out across other key Rhodesian industries, such as its mining sector.

No Trade, No Weapons

Finally, patrolling the border aside, the embargo left Rhodesia without the weapons it needed to win the conflict. 

For example, by far the favorite weapon of soldiers serving in the Bush War was the classic Rhodesian FAL, particularly the variant with the folding, paratrooper-style stock; Chris Cocks writes about this in his Fire Force book. However, Rhodesia had limited capacity to produce such weapons, and the South Africans would only sell them so many, so only the first-tier units received the precious, beloved Rhodesian FALs; the other units got lumped with the Portuguese G3, another 7.62 NATO-caliber rifle, as the FALs were too scarce. 

The same situation played out across the munitions matter generally, with there never being enough bombs, ammunition, machine guns, or other weapons to arm what troops there were. 

Similarly, the large size and underpopulated nature of Rhodesia, along with its porous border, made Fire Force missions–paradropping elite Rhodesian Light Infantry troops right on top of the communist terrorists–a necessary and highly effective tactic. But because of the embargo, there were never enough C-47 transport planes for the paratroopers, much less enough of the helicopters that made for an even more effective version of the tactic. 

The Bottom Line: The West Turned on Rhodesia and Destroyed Its Economy

Countless variations of the same general theme played out time and time again across the Bush War period, and were a major reason why Rhodesia lost the Bush War: its economy was suffering, and its troops were left without the weapons they needed to fight and win, whatever their heroic attempts at doing so.

2. The Carnation Revolution

As mentioned above, two of the primary reasons why Rhodesia lost the Bush War were that it couldn’t patrol its lengthy border effectively, and that it lacked much-needed oil. Both of those factors were made immensely worse by the 1974 Carnation Revolution.

The Collapse of Portugal and the Rise of FRELIMO

Before Portugal fell to the socialists in 1974 and gave up its remaining colonies, such as Mozambique, it had been arm in arm with the Rhodesians, fighting communist terrorism in southern Africa. Namely, it fought FRELIMO, its communist rebel group, from 1962 on, in a war quite similar to the Bush War. 

As it did so, it and Rhodesia were loyal comrades in arms. They fought alongside each other, traded tactics and intelligence, and Portugal let blockade-running oil tankers who made it past the ineffective Royal Navy blockade off the coast dock at the port of Beira, in southern Mozambique. 

A New Frontline and a Tougher Enemy

Right across the Rhodesian border, Beira was a perfect port for the Rhodesians, as the limited distance meant that bringing oil into the country via rail-tanker or oil pipeline was relatively simple…so long as the Portuguese remained friendly and in control of Mozambique. That changed in 1974-5, as the Salazar government ended and Mozambique was handed to the FRELIMO terrorists. From that point on, Rhodesia couldn’t import oil through Beira and had to rely on the unreliable South Africans.

Further, Mozambique’s fall expanded the war enormously at a time when Rhodesia, thanks to the oil crunch and loss of Beira, couldn’t afford it. Not only was the Mozambique-Rhodesia border far longer than the embattled nation’s border with Zambia, but FRELIMO proved a much more welcoming host than the Zambians, meaning the communist troops under Nkomo and Zimbabwe had a better sanctuary in which to train and rest. So, the terrorists henceforth had nearly three times as much land to use in their attempts to infiltrate Rhodesia, and better training and morale because of their new sanctuary.

The Turning Point in the Bush War

Because of those factors, the Bush War expanded enormously and became far more dangerous in 1974. Before then, the war was a hard fight, but still relatively small and controllable. After that, the Rhodesians were in serious trouble and had to negotiate, weakening their focus and war support when they needed to remain united and focused on their dire situation. 

3. The Demographic Change

Up until 1975, Rhodesia had a reasonably good shot at winning the Bush War, even with the embargo and Mozambique situation. After it, the situation was increasingly hopeless and Rhodesia’s Bush War defeat more a matter of “when” than “if.”

That existential issue was that it no longer had a growing white population that could fight the war.

The Role of White Farmers and Reservists

Up until 1975, the white population of around a quarter-million people was still growing, albeit more slowly as the war dragged on, and so there were enough young people that could be drafted into the elite, primarily white units like the aforementioned RLI, the Rhodesian SAS, the Grey’s Scouts, and the Rhodesian Air Force. Black troops fought incredibly well and bravely in the Selous Scouts and Rhodesian African Rifles, but really, it was white Rhodesians who were relied upon to fill out the ranks.

Further, it was primarily the white farmers–men who had laborers on whom they could rely to keep the farm running in their absence–who could staff the second-tier units, such as the reservists in the army and British South Africa Police (a militarized police force). Those men were needed in their tens of thousands, as responding to farm attacks required local units who knew how to fight, could respond to calls for help quickly, and would fight well once there. 

The Exodus Begins

The men to staff those units existed in large enough numbers until 1975, when the white population began to fall. From then forward, particularly as communist moral victories in the countryside turned the black villagers into unwilling opponents of their government, whites fled, and there were not enough men to fill the ranks. 

This problem became extremely severe by 1978 as white Rhodesians fled the savage farm attacks and dire political situation in their tens of thousands. As a result, soon the Rhodesians essentially ran out of men with whom they could fight the war as it needed to be fought. At such a point, the war was lost, and the Rhodesians surrendered. 

4. South African Betrayal of Rhodesia

Before the Bush War began, Salazar warned Ian Smith, as is recounted in JRT Wood’s So Far and No Further!, that the South Africans would prove unsteady allies in the war. Sadly, that turned out to be true.

 

At first, they were willing to aid the Rhodesians in quite large ways. Up until the Carnation Revolution disaster, South African units helped defend the Rhodesian roads and border, weapons (including aircraft) were provided in notable numbers, Rhodesian goods could be exported more or less freely to South Africa, and generally, it was helpful.

The Shift Toward Detente

Then the winds of change blew like a hurricane. Namely, the wish for “detente” shared by both Nixon and Carter meant that America was pulling back from its ostensible Cold War stance of fighting communism, and instead was willing to engage with the communist powers, particularly in Africa. 

To South Africa, that meant that America would henceforth be unwilling to support its attempts to defeat the communists within and without its borders, and that it needed, as a result, to strike similar detente-minded deals with the communist powers in its region.

A Costly Change of Heart

So, led by the spineless President Vorster, they tried to appease the Zambians, FRELIMO, and other powers by taking their foot off the pedal of aid for Rhodesia. Weapons shipments were no longer forthcoming, goods were held up at the border, auxiliary military personnel were pulled out, and so on. 

Some help was still provided, and by the late ’70s, the South Africans saw the error of their ways and repented by providing the Ian Smith government with much-needed help. But, in the interim, they had done too much damage to the Rhodesian cause. Namely, their detente-minded refusal to ship Rhodesia much-needed supplies had hurt the Bush War effort when help was most needed, and South Africa’s pushing and prodding with appeasement-minded diplomatic initiatives like the disastrous Victoria Falls conference put Rhodesia in a terrible diplomatic position.

So, while South Africa could have had a resource-rich, prosperous ally on its northern border that served as a bulwark against communism, it instead got the Mugabe-ruled Zimbabwe, a trainwreck of a country that advanced the communist cause and flooded South Africa with illegal immigrants. Had Vorster and his political allies not been cowards, that wouldn’t have been the case. But, because they were more like Jimmy Carter than Ian Smith, they caused Rhodesia’s Bush War defeat and ultimately doomed themselves.

5. Rhodesia’s Poor Military Policy

While the Rhodesians fought well, they were somewhat poorly led. Particularly, their government, while capable at implementing counter-insurgency tactics, lacked any grand strategy that would put them in a winning position, and were unwilling to consider out-of-the-box alternatives to traditional British “police action” fighting.

A Self-Inflicted Manpower Crisis

For one, the politicians and generals refused to let the black Rhodesians in the military outnumber the white Rhodesians, a major problem given that there were millions of blacks–many of whom wanted to serve–and only a quarter-million whites. At first, when the policy might have made sense; the risks of revolt could have outweighed the benefits of building an unnecessarily large military. 

But by the time it was 1976 and the war was raging, racial reasons for not recruiting loyal black Rhodesians to fight the communists should have been out the window, given the increasingly problematic manpower crunch and the existential nature of the war with the ascendant terrorists. Instead, the donkeys in charge let their prejudice override their common sense, and Rhodesia lost the Bush War in part because of very avoidable manpower reasons.

The Cost of Losing South Africa

Second, the operations into communist sanctuaries–Mozambique and Zambia–were tactical victories but strategic defeats. In each case, such as Operations Eland, Dingo, and Gatling, thousands of rebels were neutralized, and major basing operations were disrupted. But those were mere tactical victories, and the communist rebels had thousands more men and countless more supplies from the PRC and USSR to rely upon. 

On the other hand, Operation Eland so enraged the peace-minded President Vorster of South Africa, who had warned Ian Smith not to expand the war, that he pulled the South African military out of Rhodesia and cut his shipments of aid to it. With a stroke, Rhodesia lost half of her helicopter pilots, a great men auxiliary troops who had been defending the border, and precious oil and munitions supplies from South Africa that were existential needs. For those major losses, it got only temporary, tactical victories.

Lions Led by Donkeys

So, while the Rhodesian troops fought well and bravely, they were like lions led by donkeys. They had done everything their nation could ask of them, but found themselves deprived of vital, precious support and resources because the leaders had no clear aim of how to win the war, and so needlessly expanding it while not drawing on the reserve of loyal, patriotic black Rhodesians who wanted to fight for their manpower-starved country but were prevented from doing so. Thus, Rhodesia lost the Bush War despite its valiant efforts.

All in All, Why Rhodesia Lost the Bush War

Had nearly any of the described issues played out differently, it is possible Rhodesia could have won the Bush War. Without the UN embargo, it wouldn’t have had to rely on South African charity, could have kept its economy strong, and would have been able to import much-needed aircraft and munitions.

Without South African perfidy, it could have stayed strong for years longer than it did in reality. Had Salazar lived a bit longer and kept Mozambique in Portuguese hands, Beira would not have been lost, and the border could have been better defended. On and on it goes: slight policy changes from America, Britain, or South Africa would have made a world of difference.

Instead, we did what we did, and Rhodesia got what it got. The free world sided with the communist world to crack down upon it, and so Rhodesia lost the Bush War for reasons that should have been avoided, but weren’t, mainly for ideological reasons. 

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